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BOOK REVIEWS

Editor's Note: Because the book reviewed in this volume concerns the
Iran-United States Claim Tribunal, the following book reviews are provided to present several views of arbitratorswho sit on the Tribunal. The
reviewers are:Judge Mosk, who was appointed to the Tribunal in 1981
by the United States; Judge Mangard, who was appointed to the Tribunal in 1981 as a third-country arbitrator;and Judge Ameli, who was
appointed to the Tribunal in 1990 by the Islamic Republic of Iran.
INTERNATIONAL

TRANSACTIONS

MENT PARTIES:

CASE LAW OF THE IRAN-UNITED
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CLAIMS INVOLVING

GOVERN-

STATES CLAIMS

By John A. Westberg, International Law Institute, Washington, D.C.: 1991. Pp. 412. $125.
TRIBUNAL.

Reviewed by Richard M. Mosk*
The 1981 Algiers Declarations provided for the creation of the IranUnited States Claims Tribunal and resulted in the release of the fiftytwo United States hostages from Iran. The purpose of the Tribunal was
to adjudicate claims brought by United States nationals against Iran, by
Iranian nationals against the United States, and by one government
against the other.
During the 1970s, as Iran began to develop and to ally itself with the
United States, investments in Iran by United States businesses increased
dramatically. Indeed, by the late 1970s, there were United States construction companies, architects, accountants, agricultural experts, computer specialists, engineers, and lawyers-including the author, John
*

Member of the California Bar; A.B. Stanford; J.D. Harvard; Member of the Iran-

U.S. Claims Tribunal 1981-1984; Substitute Member 1984-present.

588

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 24.587

Westberg-working in Iran. In addition, the United States government
and United States defense contractors began to supply Iran with modern
weaponry.
During and after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which culminated in
February of that year, United States contractors could not complete services and did not receive payments that they claimed were owing. Accordingly, they commenced litigation against Iran in United States courts
and attached Iranian assets. It is unclear whether the United States
claimants ultimately would have succeeded in United States courts in
view of possible Iranian defenses like sovereign immunity and the act of
state doctrine. Also, a number of United States contractors had caused
standby letters of credit to be issued in favor of Iranian entities to guarantee performance. These Iranian entities began calling the letters of
credit so that the United States companies had to commence legal actions
in an attempt to enjoin the enforcement of these letters of credit. There
were hundreds of actions brought in United States courts against Iran
and entities controlled by the Iranian government.
In November 1979, United States hostages were taken, and President
Carter froze or blocked Iranian assets subject to United States jurisdiction in response.' The disposition of United States private claims against
Iran and the return of frozen Iranian assets became major issues in
resolving the hostage crisis that the parties finally concluded by an agreement referred to as the Algiers Accords or Algiers Declarations.'
The Algiers Declarations consist of two declarations issued by Algeria
and a number of technical implementing agreements, to which the governments of the United States and Iran adhered. The first declaration,
the General Declaration, provided for the release of the hostages and for
a number of United States undertakings, including the nullification of
attachments, the cessation of litigation against Iran in United States
courts, and the transfer of Iranian assets. Of the billions of dollars of
blocked funds, a large portion satisfied certain United States bank loans;
some of the funds went into escrow in connection with the ultimate resolution of disputed interest on these loans; some of the monies were returned to Iran; and one billion dollars was placed in a security account
to insure payment of awards in favor of United States claimants before a
tribunal to be established by the second declaration. The Algiers Decla-

1. Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. No. 65,729, 65,956-58 (1979), reprinted
in 18 I.L.M. 1549, 1552-56 (1979).
2. Declaration of the Government of Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria
(General Declaration), January 19, 1981, reprinted in 1 IRAN-U.S. CL. TRIB. REP. 3
(1981-82), 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 418 (1981).
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rations required Iran to replenish this security account whenever the balance in the account fell below 500 million dollars.
The second declaration, the Claims Settlement Declaration (CSD)
provided for the establishment of an international arbitral entity, the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (the Tribunal), to resolve various
claims by the nationals of one state against the other state and the two
states against each other. The United States Supreme Court upheld the
power of the President both to suspend United States litigation3 pursuant
to the Algiers Declarations and to enter into the declarations.
The Algiers Declarations provided that the Tribunal was to consist of
nine members-three to be designated by the United States, three to be
designated by Iran, and the final three, presumably from other states, to
be chosen by the six government-appointed arbitrators. The Algiers Declarations mandated that the security account be established in the
Netherlands Central Bank. In May 1981, the United States and Iran
each designated its respective Tribunal members. Thereafter, the six
government-appointed members selected 'third-country members.
Except for claims under 250 thousand dollars, which the governments
were to present on behalf of their nationals, individual parties filed their
own claims. Most of the claims were those filed by United States companies alleging breaches of contract and expropriations. Iran often counterclaimed for damages, based on alleged defective performance, for return
or delivery of equipment, or for non-payment of taxes allegedly due. The
governments filed official claims relating to prior commercial and military relations and disputes concerning the interpretation and implementation of the Algiers Declarations. The Algiers Declarations required the
filing of claims, but not disputes, within one year.
The Tribunal divided into panels of three to hear cases, although the
full Tribunal of nine heard and decided certain important issues. Although the Tribunal has been referred to as an arbitral body, its
caseload makes it more nearly resemble a judicial system. The arbitrators often have been referred to as judges.
Despite unfriendly relations between the two governments, the skepticism of United States parties towards the Tribunal, the beliefs of those
in Iran that the Tribunal was imposed upon it, the thousands of cases,
the difficulties of obtaining evidence, and different languages and laws,
the Tribunal continues to function. It developed procedures, held hearings, and rendered reasoned awards that were paid. The Tribunal also
facilitated settlements, and most of the major claims have been resolved.
3. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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Iran and the United States ultimately settled the small claims by a lump
sum payment to the United States, which will resolve these claims
through the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission.
The Tribunal is an entity formed under public international law with
jurisdiction to resolve interstate cases, but it has dealt primarily with
private commercial disputes. By virtue of the CSD, the Tribunal had
wide latitude in the application of law. The Tribunal applied public
international law in connection with issues involving expropriation and
nationalization. It sometimes invoked national law after applying choice
of law principles, and occasionally applied what it determined to be general principles of law.
Professor Richard Lillich, an expert on international claims tribunals,
described the Tribunal as "the most significant arbitral body in history."4 Judge Abraham D. Sofaer, the former Legal Adviser to the
United States State Department, stated that the Tribunal has "produced
more international law than any law-making body in the history of mankind." 5 Furthermore, because the Tribunal utilized adaptation's of the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules," "the Tribunal has encountered and resolved
procedural issues ... that might have taken decades to arise in the nor7
mal course of commercial arbitration."
There have been differing views, however, as to the usefulness of Tribunal jurisprudence on substantive issues. Judge Howard Holtzmann
has stated that the Tribunal's opinions are a valuable source of information to those involved in international business, referring to the awards
as "a gold mine of information for perceptive lawyers."' A practitioner
has written, "The number of the Tribunal's awards applying 'general
principles of law,' as well as the relatively wide availability of the Tribunal's awards, assures that the Tribunal's jurisprudence will influence

4. RICHARD B.
at vii (1984).

LILLICH, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL

1981-1983

5.

Voice of America interview with Judge Abraham D. Sofaer (June 12, 1990), reMEALEY'S INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION REPORT, July 1990, at 15.
6. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Decision on Arbitration Rules, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 701 (1976).

printed in

7. Stewart A. Baker and Mark D. Davis, Establishment of an Arbitral Tribunal
Under the UNCITRAL Rules: The Experience of the Iran-UnitedStates Claims Tribunal, 1989 Int'l Law. 81, 84.
8. Howard M. Holtzmann, Some Lessons of the Iran-UnitedStates Claims Tribunal, 1987 PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD-PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS at 16-5 (J. Moss ed.).
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international arbitration for years to come." 9
On the' other hand, some have downplayed the significance of Tribunal decisions because the decisions "involve[] a special type of arbitration." 10 Professor Caron has said that "the Tribunal does not represent a
coherent jurisprudence. . . . There are three chambers and they take
subtly different approaches to a number of issues. . . .[T]he chambers
have changed dramatically over time."1 There have been suggestions
that Tribunal awards represent politically-induced or compromise decisions.1 2 Professor Caron has added that he would "speculate that the
reluctance of some private international arbitrators to rely on the Tribunal's decisions reflects their intuitive conclusion that the Tribunal involves the classic interstate arbitral process and the further intuitive conclusion that the process is therefore particularly politicized."1 3
Some believe that because the third-country chairmen are all from developed and European states, the jurisprudence is distorted. One critic
has stated: "International arbitration between a Third World country
and a developed nation is inherently hazardous because of the unequal
bargaining positions and the former's lack of technical expertise."1 4
Others have suggested that "forceful dissenting and concurring opinions
tend to limit the authority of the Tribunal awards."' 5 Some, particularly
Iranians, suggest that various awards were defective or were the result of
undue pressure, and therefore should not be considered as authority.
The views questioning the authority of Tribunal decisions are not necessarily valid. All arbitral and judicial entities could be analyzed to question their awards or judgments. For example, United States Supreme
Court opinions are not of less weight because justices are appointed by
virtue of their philosophy or views on issues. International Court of Justice opinions are not accorded less value because the judges, although
Grant Hanessian, "General Principlesof Law" in the Iran-U.S. Claims TribuCOLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 309, 311 (1989).
10. David D. Caron, The Nature of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and
the Evolving Structure of InternationalDispute Resolution, 84 AM. J. INT. L. 104
(1990).
11. David D. Caron, Attribution Amidst Revolution: The Experience of the IranUnited States Claims Tribunal, PROC. ANN. Soc'Y INT'L L. 65 (1990).
12. See Caron, supra note 10, at 105 n.4; M. SORNARAJAH, THE PURSUIT OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY 202 (1986); see also Ted. L. Stein, JurisprudenceandJurists'
Prudence: The Iranian-ForumClause Decisions of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1984).
13. Caron, supra note 10, at 105 n.4.
9.

nal, 27

14.

RAHMATULLAH

KHAN,

(1990).
15. See Nils Mangdrd, 24

THE IRAN-UNITED

VAND.

J.

TRANSNAT'L

STATES CLAIMS

TRIBUNAL

L. 597, 609 (1991).
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appointed by the United Nations, may be affected by the political or
legal principles of their home state.
Moreover, in United States appellate courts, opinions often reflect
compromises in order to obtain a majority, and sometimes even unanimity. Speculation often occurs that United States courts have tailored a
decision to political realities or public opinion. Indeed, a highly
respected, retired California Supreme Court Justice, when discussing
public and electoral pressures on appellate justices, declared that it is
difficult to ignore "a crocodile in the bathtub." This is just a variation on
Mr. Dooley's remark that the Supreme Court follows the election
returns.
Dissenting and concurring opinions do not necessarily limit the authority of awards. Prior to the Tribunal, there was some degree of unfamiliarity in international adjudication with separate opinions. One must
evaluate the differences among the various opinions. For example, a concurring opinion often agrees with the majority opinion on the issue of
liability, but may rely on other theories to reach this result or may differ
on the amount of damages. Such opinions should not detract from the
authority of the award. Moreover, the concurring opinion, or even the
dissenting opinion, if well reasoned, can be of assistance in analyzing the
case.
Even if, as some suggest, the developed state's influence has an inordinate impact on awards, that again only explains the origin of the authority. This theory does not lead to the conclusion that the authority cannot
be utilized in determining the applicable law.
Some have criticized Tribunal decisions for allegedly ignoring certain
issues. Just as with appellate decisions in the United States, avoiding an
issue may be necessary to obtain a majority or may be prudent to avoid a
particularly sensitive issue that is not indispensable to the award.
Whatever the composition of the Tribunal, and no matter how it
reached its decisions, each opinion represents a prediction of what one
can expect an international tribunal to determine on a particular legal
issue. In that respect, Tribunal decisions and awards should be viewed
as useful authority with respect to international law and general principles of law.
No one suggests that international arbitration awards are binding. Indeed, even within the Tribunal itself, legal results did not always serve
as binding precedent. Because stare decisis is not a universal principle,
this is not surprising. Yet, the Tribunal chambers did adhere to principles established by the full Tribunal, and, for the most part, principles
enunciated in one award were applied, or at least utilized, in later
awards. Additionally, the Tribunal awards reportedly induced settle-
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ments in other tribunal cases, 16 which suggests that the parties recognized the effects of and adherence to the awards.
In the United States, arbitration awards in specific fields sometimes
are published and later cited in other opinions. This occurs in labor arbitrations. Admittedly, those in the United States resort to authorities
and precedent more often than those subject to other legal systems. Nevertheless, because of the paucity of published authorities on many international issues, the Tribunal decisions, which are reported widely,
should be utilized extensively.
Also enhancing the usefulness of Tribunal opinions is the fact that
each award sets forth a lengthy statement of proceedings, facts, contentions, and a full discussion of factual and legal authorities. Furthermore,
there are often lengthy concurring and dissenting opinions, which not
only contain a worthwhile exposition of legal issues, but also have compelled the majority to grapple with any purported deficiencies in its
reasoning.
One possible defect in Tribunal practice was in its application of the
17
Tribunal and UNCITRAL rules compelling a majority for an award.
There is a view that this rule means that for the ultimate award or
disposition, a majority of arbitrators must concur.' In some cases, however, a Tribunal member would concur in the first part of the award and
dissent from the second part, while another member would dissent from
the first part and concur in the second part. Consequently, there is no
majority for the ultimate award. Nevertheless, the Tribunal has acquiesced in this procedure, thereby affording the chairperson ultimate
power. In addition, concurring opinions may disagree with the award,
but join in order to form a majority. This probably constitutes compliance with the rule for a majority. The chairperson, however, still has
power, but must obtain the acquiescence of one of the other members.
One can speculate how these procedures could affect the decision-making process. On the one hand, it could dilute the value of the authority of
the award because a majority is not really a majority. On the other hand,
the reasoning is less likely to represent a compromise that might be nec16.

L. Reed, The Iran-United States Claims Tribunal: Some Lessons in Retrospect,

Paper prepared for the Joint Conference of the American 'Society of International Law
and Nederlandse Vereniging-voor International Recht, on "Contemporary International
Law Issues: Sharing Pan European and American Perspectives," July 4-6, 1991 at 5.

(forthcoming from Kluwer/Martinus Nijhoff, the Netherlands).
17.

Article 31(1) of The Final Tribunal Rules of Procedure, reprinted in 2 Iran-

U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 405, 433 (1984).
18.

Ultrasystems Inc. v. Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 77, 82 (1983) (dissenting

opinion).
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essary to form a pure majority.
Some members of the Tribunal, including myself, often penned concurring or dissenting opinions. Such opinions demonstrated to the parties
that the Tribunal considered all of the issues. These opinions contained
arguments and authorities that could be useful to academics, practitioners, and other tribunals. Certainly there was never any surprise in separate opinions, for the arguments contained in them were aired during
deliberations. Moreover, separate opinions could inspire care in the
preparation of the awards and majority opinions.
The separate opinions, although sometimes strident, provided a fascinating legal debate over significant issues. Often I was struck by the fact
that individuals from different legal systems generally operated under
the same basic principles and debated only the application of those principles to the particular facts. I found my colleagues, Iranian, European,
and American, to be intelligent and able.
The ultimate effect of Tribunal awards depends on the value of their
reasoning and persuasiveness. Unlike the product of past tribunals, the
awards usually resulted from powerful, vigorous, and skillful advocacy.
Additionally, unlike decisions of past tribunals, the awards themselves
contained lengthy and detailed expositions of the facts, the relevant authority, and the applicable law. The members of the Tribunal included
well-known scholars in international law and arbitration, as well as high
government officials, academics, and judges.
The United States agent to the Tribunal recently observed, "Tribunal
cases appear prominently in the literature now and, I understand, are
valuable as precedents in private commercial arbitrations."' 9 Whether
tribunal awards actually represent or contribute to what the law is, they
should be helpful to one entering into a transaction, as well as to judicial
and international bodies.
John Westberg utilizes tribunal awards and decisions to discuss a host
of complex issues that may arise in international transactions and adjudications. These issues include applicable law, forum selection, sovereign
immunity, act of state, state responsibility, monetary issues, stabilization
clauses, expropriations, force majeure, contract breaches, and damages.
His principal source of material is the awards of the Tribunal issued in
contested cases. When the settlements are made accessible, it might be
worth studying them in connection with the claims, possibly to derive
some generalizations about settlements by government agencies.
The author does not, and cannot, address all of the legal issues that
19. Reed, supra note 16, at 6. In addition, Mr. Westberg's book contains a bibliography of writings on the Tribunal.

1991]

BOOK REVIEW

came before the Tribunal. Rather, he selected those with which he believes the international business lawyer should be familiar. It would take
a more comprehensive work to cover all, or even most, of the issues that
came before the Tribunal. Yet one could say that if an issue arose, by
definition, it might be of significance to those doing business
internationally.
There are some issues that the book did not cover, but that could be
useful for international claims procedures. These issues include the
rights of shareholders, partners, indirect owners, insurance companies,
and nonprofit corporations. Other important Tribunal subjects that did
not receive significant attention in the book include remedies (such as
interim relief), letters of credit, quasi-contract, and illegality. The refusal
of the Tribunal to apply some principles also deserves some mention.20
Some of the evidentiary and procedural decisions that the author did not
address could be of value to practitioners in framing dispute resolution
clauses and in actually handling claims. It might have been useful if the
author listed the various issues with which he did not have to deal in
detail.
One could quibble with various points in the book. For example, in
the chapter on government control, there is no discussion of the initial
precedent-setting cases."' Furthermore, the discussion of the Oil Field of
Texas case 22 may be deficient because it does not point out the full holding of the case. Although the Tribunal did hold in that case, pursuant to
unspecified law, that government control or agency did not exist, general
principles of law might impose liability on the government for the company's debt as a de facto successor.
The author's discussion of state acts as force majeure ignores a key
case in the area. The Tribunal's majority opinion in Blount Bros. Corp.
v. Islamic Republic of Iran23 provided as follows:
The position of a state enterprise in circumstances of force majeure has
been widely discussed. The starting point is acknowledged to be the principle that the separation between a state enterprise and the state itself
should be respected, with the result that acts of public authority by the
20. See, e.g., American Hous. Int'l Inc. v. Housing Coop. Soc'y, 5 Iran-U.S. Cl.
Trib. Rep. 235, 242, 248 (1984) (dissenting opinion) (noting that the majority did not

apply various doctrines such as culpa in contrahendo).
21. See, e.g., Rexnord Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 6,
9 (1983); Rayco Wagner Equip. Co. v. Iran Express Terminal Corp., 2 Iran-U.S. Cl.
Trib. Rep. 140, 141, 146 (1983) (concurring and dissenting opinions).

22. Oil Field of Texas, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep.
347 (1982).
23. 10 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 56, 75 (1986).
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state may operate as force majeure and excuse the state enterprise from
liability.
The Tribunal then discussed the applicable factors and concluded that
state action in this case should not preclude the application of force
majeure. The concurring opinion also dealt with the issue.24
In the discussion of foreign exchange controls, the author does not discuss how the Tribunal actually avoided addressing the critical issue of
the validity of the exchange controls. The Tribunal did so by holding
that a sufficient demand for foreign exchange had not been made, either
upon the local bank or upon the central bank.2 5 These cases should provide a lesson regarding how to preserve one's claim when that claim
involves foreign exchange. Also, the author probably should have discussed the role of insurance, whether private or by the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC), as an important subject for one conducting business abroad.
The author made every effort to present the subjects clearly, and, for
the most part, he succeeded. The use of detailed factual accounts of the
cases and lengthy quotes, however, sometimes detracted from the discussion. Generally, the book deals with a large body of law in a well-organized and cohesive fashion.
Certainly, this work will be useful for those preparing for the claims
against Iraq arising out of the Persian Gulf War. 2 1 In addition, as international business transactions continue to accelerate, books such as John
Westberg's will be extremely valuable to lawyers and businessmen. The
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal exposed the prior tendency of those
doing business abroad and with governments to ignore in their contracts
many predictable issues. In the future, lawyers and parties should have
no excuse for disregarding these issues.
The Tribunal provided an opportunity for many lawyers to become
involved with international issues and international arbitration. John
Westberg's book can bring much of this experience to those who were
unable to participate.

24. Id. at 82.
25. Hood Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 7 Iran-U.S. C1. Trib. Rep. 36 (1984);
Schering Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 5 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 361 (1984);
Blount Bros. Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 10 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 95 (1986).
26, Iraqi procedures, however, appear to be different. See Report of the SecretaryGeneral Pursuant to Paragraph 19 of Security Council Resolution 667 (1991).
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Reviewed by Nils Mang~rd*
Introductory Notes
On November 4, 1979, about nine months after the official date of the
victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran, a powerful group of armed
individuals overran the United States Embassy compound in Tehran.
They seized as hostages all diplomats, consular personnel, and other persons present. As a result of negotiations between the Iranian and the
United States governments, with the government of Algeria acting as an
intermediary, the hostages were freed 444 days later.
The official Algerian resolution that led to the hostages' freedom consisted of two declarations made by the Algerian government on the basis
of formal adherences received from Iran and the United States:' the
General Declaration, recording the central commitments of the parties,
and the Claims Settlement Declaration (CSD), which established the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal (Tribunal) as the mechanism envisaged in the General Declaration for facilitating the settlement of claims
through binding arbitration.2
* Retired Judge of Court of Appeal in Stockholm; Former Chairman of the IranUnited States Claims Tribunal, Chamber Three, 1981-1985; University of Stockholm,
L.L.B.
1. The two Algerian declarations together with annexed documents are referred to
collectively as the "Algiers Accords." J. WESTBERG, INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS
AND CLAIMS INVOLVING GOVERNMENT PARTIES: CASE LAW OF THE IRAN-UNITED

STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 4 (1991).

2. Id. For a better understanding of some of the problems within the Tribunal-the
sometimes difficult working conditions in a contentious political climate, the extremely
low percentage of unanimous decisions-it may be useful to call attention to the composition of the Tribunal. It is composed of nine members: three members appointed by the
United States, three members appointed by Iran, and three third-country members appointed by the mutual agreement of the Iranian and United States members, or, failing
agreement, by an appointing authority. The nine arbitrators sit in three separate chambers, each consisting of an Iranian, United States, and third-country arbitrator. In all
chambers, the third-country arbitrator is the chairperson. The nine arbitrators also sit
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The Algiers Accords contained a commitment by Iran of vital importance to the United States. Iran established a special security account
containing one billion dollars of unfrozen Iranian assets to be used "for
the sole purpose of securing payment of, and paying, claims against Iran
in accordance with the CSD." 3 Iran further agreed to maintain the account at a minimum of 500 million dollars until all arbitral awards
against Iran had been satisfied.
The Tribunal was set up in The Hague, The Netherlands. The actual work on the approximately 4000 cases submitted to the Tribunal
began in the spring of 1982, and the Tribunal rendered the first decisions on the merits at the end of that year. Since then, the Tribunal has
issued some 250 awards and decisions in major contested cases.
Mr. John A. Westberg's work reviews the major legal issues impacting the international business community with which the Tribunal
has dealt through 1990.4 Mr. Westberg is an experienced international
business lawyer who practices from offices in Washington, D.C. and
Falls Church, Virginia. He has worked previously in. London and Tehran and has been involved with a large number of claims before the
Tribunal and other international tribunals. Therefore, he was wellsuited to perform the work he has now accomplished.
In the preface of his book, Mr. Westberg stresses the importance of
the Tribunal since that body represents the first collection of readilyavailable case law of international business. Moreover, the size of the
Tribunal's case load assures that it will have addressed most, if not all,
of the legal issues that may arise in the context of international business.
An Outline of the Content of the Book
The book presents the material in eight chapters. The text of the Algiers Accords, including ancillary agreements, the Tribunal's Rules of
Procedure, and a selective bibliography on the Tribunal are appended.

together as a Full Tribunal to decide certain matters. The Declaration of the Democratic
and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of
Iran, Jan 19, 1981, reprinted in I Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep.9 (1981-2) [hereinafter
CSD].
3. Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, Jan. 19, 1981, reprinted in I Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3, 5 (1981-2).
4. The author examines the awards and case law of the Tribunal and not the Tribunal itself. For a more complete description of the Tribunal's organization and work, see,

e.g., Nils Mangard, The Hostage Crisis, the Algiers Accords, and the Iran-UnitedStates
Claims Tribunal, in FESTSKRIFr TILL LARS HJERNER: STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL

LAW (1990).
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To deal with all the interesting points addressed in the book within the
space available for this review is not feasible. For the benefit of a prospective reader, however, a brief survey of the main issues treated in
each chapter seems appropriate.
Chapter One, "The Tribunal," is limited to a general description of
the Tribunal and certain key provisions of the Algiers Accords. This
chapter further deals with the Tribunal's jurisdiction,-the lack of which
the respondent normally raises in every claim-the applicable substantive law, and the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL) Decision on Arbitration Rules.' Additionally, this
chapter enumerates certain features that distinguish the Tribunal from
earlier international claims tribunals.
In Chapter Two, the author discusses ways in which a drafting lawyer can ensure that a government party is bound to enforce the terms of
an agreement at law. As a background, he deals with sovereign immunity and the act of state doctrine. He then proceeds to issues of particular
interest before the Tribunal because of its limited jurisdiction, namely
state responsibility, agencies, and controlled entities. For example, in the
case of United States claimants, the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear
only claims against Iran. Therefore, all United States claimants must
prove that Iran, if not itself a party, at minimum controls the entity
against which the claim is directed. This question of control is one of the
more controversial ones with which the Tribunal has had to deal, and it
has been raised in numerous cases. A distinction must be made, however,
between government control sufficient to give the Tribunal jurisdiction
over a claim, and control that makes the entity the alter ego of the government or otherwise engages the responsibility of the state under international law. Furthermore, the existence of the security account makes it
less necessary in many cases to reach the issue of government responsibility. Claims against an entity held to be controlled by the Iranian government also are paid out of the security account. Accordingly, this issue
is a sensitive matter for Iran.
Chapter Three of the book raises important issues of applicable law.
The author points out that since international business transactions, by
definition, engage parties from different states. and legal traditions, the
law applied to a particular legal question may impact the outcome significantly. The author discerns three different questions falling under the
applicable law rubric.' In practice, other questions appear even more

5. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Deci-

sion on Arbitration Rules, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 701 (1976).
6. The three questions that Mr. Westberg finds relevant are: (i) What law governs
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relevant: First, will an international tribunal in all circumstances uphold
a contract's reference to the national, substantive law of one party? Second, what law will apply in the absence of an applicable law clause?
The author dedicates a separate subsection to the issue of applicable
law in expropriation claims.' The author notes that since these claims do
not involve any contract, there normally will not be any applicable law
clause to construe, and the validity issue will not arise. Instead, the Tribunal will have to determine what law governs the claim of expropriation in all its aspects, including the fundamental issues of whether an
expropriation has taken place and the appropriate remedy. Moreover,
expropriation issues always touch the ongoing controversy surrounding
the law of expropriation between the capital-exporting industrialized
states of the world, and the Third World and socialist states.'
In the summary of Tribunal decisions on applicable law, the author
notes with regret that these have reflected the general uncertainty that
existed before the formation of the Tribunal. Regarding contract claims,
however, the author believes that both choice of law clauses and conflict
of laws rules will fall by the wayside if their application would provide a
manifestly unfair or unjust result. The author further notes that in expropriation claims the Tribunal finally, although hesitantly, recognized
the applicability of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United States and Iran to the questions of
whether an expropriation has taken place and the applicable standard
for measuring the compensation owed. This has made the Tribunal's
task easier, but it does not relieve other tribunals from the duty to research the position of customary international law on these questions
when no similar treaties that bind the parties exist.
The author then proceeds to address forum-selection clauses. He notes
initially that these clauses have gradually become regarded as enforceable, barring exceptional circumstances. He also points out that the CSD
contains a provision that excludes from the Tribunal's jurisdiction any
"claims arising under a binding contract between the parties specifically
providing that any dispute thereunder shall be within the sole jurisdiction of the competent Iranian courts." Many cases before the Tribunal
the validity or binding effect of the contract? (ii) What law will govern procedural issues

in an arbitration or litigation? (iii) What law will govern the substantive rights and
obligations of the parties. WESTBERG, supra note 1,at 60.
7. Expropriation encompasses all forms of the taking of alien property, whether by
nationalization, expropriation, or other forms of governmental interference with property

rights.
8.

9.

See generally WESTBERG, supra note 1, at 211-51.
WESTBERG, supra note 1, at 87 (quoting CSD, supra note 2, art. II, § I, re-
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involved contracts containing a similar clause that, according to the Iranian respondent, deprived the Tribunal of jurisdiction.
To establish whether choice of forum clauses met the requirements of
the exclusion provision, the three chambers relinquished jurisdiction over
nine cases containing nineteen differently worded contractual clauses and
asked the full Tribunal to decide "whether claims therein arising out of
contracts containing provisions for the settlement of disputes fall within
the scope" 10 of that provision. In November 1982, the Tribunal rendered
interlocutory awards in all nine cases. The Tribunal deemed some
clauses to exclude its jurisdiction, with concurring and dissenting opinions regarding the interpretation of almost every clause. The result was
that the Tribunal upheld jurisdiction over thirteen claims, but found no
jurisdiction in the remaining six. Two United States arbitrators held that
none of the forum selection clauses bound the United States claimants
because of changed circumstances in Iran."
Chapter Four, "Liability for Expropriation," is one of the more important parts of the book. The author notes that while the subject has
been addressed extensively, all of the commentary thus far has failed to
reconcile the contending public positions between the socialist and capital-importing states, and the capital-exporting states. The author then
tries to answer certain questions that normally arise when an expropriation occurs by using material from outside the Tribunal and by examining the Tribunal decisions on various expropriation issues.
The last section of Chapter Four raises the issue of other measures
effecting property rights. While this concept has been present in the in-

printed in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 9).
10. Gibbs & Hill, Inc. v. Tavanir, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 236 (1982) (interlocutory award); Halliburton Co. v. Doreen/IMCO, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 242 (1982)
(interlocutory award); Howard, Needles, Tammen & Bergendoff (HNTB) v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 248 (1982) (interlocutory award); Drucker
v. Foreign Transaction Co., 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.Rep. 252 (1982) (interlocutory award);
T.G.S.B., Inc. v. Iran, 1 Iran U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 261 (1982) (interlocutory award);
Ford Aerospace & Comm. Corp. v. Air Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1 IranU.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 268 (1982) (interlocutory award); Zokor Int'l Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 1 Iran-U.S. C1. Trib. Rep. 271 (1982) (interlocutory award); Stone & Webster Overseas Group, Inc. v. National Petrochemical Co., 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 274
(1982) (interlocutory award); Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 1 IranU.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 280 (1982) (interlocutory award).
11. Concurring & Dissenting opinions of Howard M. Holtzmann with Respect to
Interlocutory Awards in Jurisdiction in Nine Cases Containing Various Forum Selection
Clauses, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 284 (1982); Concurring & Dissenting Opinions of
Richard M. Mosk on the Issues of Jurisdiction, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 305 (1982)
[hereinafter Mosk & Holtzmann Opinions].
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ternational claims literature for a long time, the express inclusion of
other measures effecting property rights in the actions within the Tribunal's jurisdiction represented something new in the international claims
practice. In the cases over the years, the Tribunal chambers have
reached differing conclusions on what constitutes measures that would
give a right to compensation. I personally believe that these measures
properly should be defined as acts of governmental interference with legal rights of aliens that do not amount to expropriation. This is because
the measures do not result in a taking, but do interfere to the extent they
have caused loss.
Chapter Five provides an interesting discussion on contract excuse.1 2
As an introduction, the author provides a brief, yet elucidating, analysis
of the different concepts and how they have been dealt with in different
legal systems. As for the Tribunal awards, the author notes that many
contract claims involving pleas of excuse for nonperformance have come
before the Tribunal. This was certainly a predictible result of the aftermath of a chaotic revolution. The pleas have come from both sides, from
contractors wishing to be excused for not having completed their contracts, and from Iran as an excuse for not making payment in accordance
with contract provisions or for ending contracts that it no longer found to
be in its interest. In all but a few cases, the excuse pleaded has been that
of force majeure. The Tribunal awards may give guidance as to what
conditions may excuse a party from its contract obligations, and also
whether these contracts should be terminated or suspended. Furthermore, the Tribunal also has addressed what remedy to grant a party
after a plea of force majeure has been accepted.
In his summary of awards involving contract excuse, the author first
shows that the Tribunal has found force majeure to be a concept recognized in most, if not all, legal systems of the world. Therefore, it is a
general principle of law that "does not depend on, or arise out of, an
express contractual provision."'" All awards recognize that the Islamic
revolution created force majeure conditions, but most of them find that
these conditions existed for only a short period of time. 4 In a number of
cases in which the parties terminated the contract for forcemajeure rea-

12. These excuses embrace the family of concepts variously referred to as force
majeure, impossibility, hardship, impracticability, frustration of contract, frustration of
purpose, and changed circumstances. WESTBERG, supra note 1, at 157.
13. WESTBERG, supra note 1, at 181-82 (quoting Anaconda-Iran v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 13 Iran-U.S. Ct. Trib. Rep. 199, 221).
14. See, e.g., Sylvania Technical Services, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 8 IranU.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 298 (1985).
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sons, the Tribunal followed the rule that the losses resulting from termination must lie where they fell, subject to the Tribunal's equitable discretion to apportion losses. 1 5 Despite such rulings, the Tribunal still has
failed to give unanimous answers to many important questions. Consequently, the law of contract excuse remains a serious problem for the
international lawyer.
Mr. Westberg's summary of decisions involving the doctrine of
changed circumstances contains a statement with which I must disagree.
He states that although the United States government and the United
States claimants made changed circumstances arguments in the Iranian
forum selection clause cases, the majority essentially ignored these arguments in its decisions." To the contrary, these arguments definitely were
not ignored, but were the subject of heated discussions. Moreover, the
majority's awards in these cases did not reject arguments that the
changes which had taken place in the legal system in Iran as a result of
the Islamic revolution constituted such a change in circumstances as to
render prerevolutionary Iranian forum-selection clauses unenforceable.
Rather, the majority's awards managed to avoid deciding that issue.
Therefore, the elegant opinions by Judges Holtzmann and Mosk, recorded in the book, are not quite on point. 7 There is always a risk that
the reader may be mislead if majority awards are abridged when compared to per se convincing dissenting opinions.
To understand the Tribunal decisions in this area, one must appreciate the political impact of this issue. The issue of changed circumstances
threatened to cause a serious crisis in the relations between the two governments, as well as within the Tribunal. The United States government
asked permission to submit extensive documentary evidence on contemporary conditions in Iran in support of the United States position., Iran
protested vehemently, declaring this action both "hostile" and "political."
The Tribunal majority, recognizing its responsibility for the survival of
the Tribunal, found an issue in the exclusion clause that provided it with
a reason to refuse acceptance of the evidence tendered by the United
States.
The Tribunal held that there was insufficient evidence to find that the

15.

Computer Sciences Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 10 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. 269

(1986).
16.

WESTBERG,

supra note 1, at 174.

17. See Mosk & Holtzmann Opinions, supra note 11.
18. The United States government attempted to submit, inter alia, evidence regarding alleged changes in the legal and judicial systems and the cruel penalties applied
under the Islamic criminal legislation.
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two governments had come to an agreement as to the meaning of the
word "binding." Alternatively, it held that the intent of the United States
negotiators in including that requirement, which allegedly was to minimize the scope of the exclusion clause in the CSD, had not been made
known to the Algerian intermediaries with sufficient clarity. The Tribunal, having attempted to ascertain the meaning of the term in its context,
then determined that neither of two possible interpretations, binding as
referring either to the choice of forum clause or to the entire contract,
contributed any sensible meaning to the term. Therefore, the Tribunal
concluded that the word "binding" is redundant.19 In these circumstances, the Tribunal, "which derives its jurisdiction only from the terms
of the Declarations," did not have to reach the question whether changes
in Iran may have any impact on the enforceability of forum selection
clauses in contracts.20
By this politically-wise and legally-correct decision, the Tribunal limited the scope of its conclusions to determine whether certain forum selection clauses excluded its own jurisdiction. Its decisions did not deprive
United States claimants of any right to bring their claims to United
States courts, where the plea of changed circumstances might be accepted
more readily.
In part, Chapter Six addresses the duty to mitigate damages, and particularly the question of whether this duty is absolute or whether only a
reasonable effort is required. The book cites an early case, as support for
the theory that the duty to mitigate is absolute.2" The panel in which I
was the presiding judge awarded the claimant, an engineer in Iranian
governmental service, damages in the amount of fees he would have received under the contract had there not been a breach. We also ruled,
however, that he should have sought other employment and deducted an
amount for what the claimant could have earned had he sought other
employment. My colleague, Judge Mosk, stated in a concurring opinion
that the claimant had a duty to take only reasonable steps to mitigate his
damages, and that the respondent had the burden of establishing that the
claimant had not sufficiently mitigated his damages.2 2 In reality, there is
no difference of opinion between myself and Judge Mosk. Since it was
clear from the pleadings that the defendant had not sought employment,
the Tribunal decided that he had not taken reasonable steps to mitigate

19.
20.
former
21.
22.

See generally cases cited supra, note 10.
It should be noted that one of the United States arbitrators, Judge Aldrich, a
State Department official, belonged to the majority.
Craig v. Ministry of Energy of Iran, 3 Iran-U.S. CL. Trib. Rep. 280 (1983).
Id. at 293-94.
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his damages.
2 3 that impossiI also share the view expressed in Endo Laboratories
bility or impracticability to mitigate damages should not lead to any reduction of damages. Alan Craig illuminates the misunderstandings that
may be caused by the frequent practice in the Tribunal of presenting
separate opinions some time after the judges sign and register a majority
award. At that point, it is too late for the opinions to influence the drafting of the award.
In this chapter, Mr. Westberg also addresses the issue of unjust enrichment, also known as quantum meruit. The Tribunal has recognized
that unjust enrichment is a separate cause of action within the Tribunal's jurisdiction. Mr. Westberg has cited the majority award in Dames
and Moore24 as a ruling against taking jurisdiction over an unjust enrichment claim on the ground that the contract in the case contained a
forum selection clause that fell within the exclusion provision of the
CSD. That is only partially correct. Actually, the Tribunal refused to
take jurisdiction because one of the essential elements of a claim of unjust enrichment was absent. Specifically, several awards have stated that
to claim unjust enrichment, there must be no contractual or other remedy available to the injured party.25 In Dames and Moore there was a
valid contract on which the claim could be based, although the Tribunal
could not accept the claim because of the forum selection clause. Thus,
the claimant was able to pursue his claim in other fora. Judge Mosk's
learned dissenting opinion in this case, insofar as it focused upon
changed circumstances, also was somewhat beside the point.
In the introduction to Chapter Seven, the author describes the traditional standard of compensation based on the so-called Hull Doctrine's
"prompt, adequate and effective" compensation equalling the full value
of the property taken. 26 He then notes that the contemporary standard at
the time of the Tribunal's creation has been said to be appropriate and
just compensation, and that deviations from the full value may be consid-

23. Endo Laboratories, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 17 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep.
114 (1987).
24. Dames & Moore v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. C1. Trib. Rep. 212

(1983).
25. Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep.
149 (1984); Ultrasystems, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep.
100, (1983); DIC of Delaware, Inc. v. Tehran Redevelopment Corp., 8 Iran-U.S. Cl.
Trib. Rep. 144 (1985); Morris-Knudsen Pacific Ltd. v. The Ministry of Roads and
Transportation, 7 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 54 (1984).
26. WESTBERG, supra note 1, at 213-14.
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ered if exceptional circumstances exist." Because the capital-importing
states oppose both standards based on certain resolutions of the United
Nations, neither the traditional nor the contemporary standard has enjoyed universal acceptance.
The Tribunal decisions on the subject show that all the chambers have
determined that the applicable standard of compensation is full compensation. They have reached that result in two ways: First, by referring to
contemporary customary law, and second, by relying on the standard set
forth in the Treaty of Amity that reflects the Hull Doctrine. The book
value of a company has never been accepted as representing the full
value. Instead, chambers prefer to use the concept of fair market value.
For an ongoing business, a company is valued as a going concern at the
date of taking, which includes goodwill and likely future profitability. In
most cases, the question of lawfulness is given no weight. Effects on the
property rights of the taking itself or of subsequent events should not be
considered, but the impact of changes in the general political, social, and
economic conditions that took place prior to the taking should be
included.
The Iranian contention is that the standard now applicable under international law is appropriate compensation in view of all the circumstances of the case. This includes, for example, the economic conditions
prevailing in the taking state. This standard, according to Iran, normally
leads to awards of partial compensation.
The only case that expressly departs from the pattern is INA Corp. v.
Islamic Republic of Iran,28 chaired by Judge Lagergren. In that case,
the court awarded full compensation based on the Treaty of Amity. The
majority award, however, in an obiter dictum, stated that in the event of
large-scale nationalizations of a lawful character, international law has
undergone a gradual reappraisal that may undermine the doctrinal value
of any full or adequate standard. In a separate opinion, Judge Lagergren concluded that the current principles of international law required
application of the appropriate compensation standard. Utilization of this
standard in taking account of all circumstances normally would require
discounting the fair market value in cases of lawful large-scale nationalizations by states undergoing a process of radical economic restructuring.
The author concludes that in later awards the Tribunal clearly seems
to ignore Judge Lagergren's plea for a flexible approach. A careful reading of Sedco, Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Co.,29 however, reveals that

27. WESTBERG, supra note 1, at 221.
28. 8 Iran-U.S. C1. Trib. Rep. 373 (1985).
29. 10 Iran-U.S. C1. Trib. Rep. 180 (1986).
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the majority limited its holding on the central issue in the case at hand:
"a discrete expropriation of alien property."30 In this manner, it avoided
pronouncing on the arguments of Judge Lagergren concerning largescale nationalizations. Judge Brower, in a concurring opinion, asserted
that the limitation of the scope of the majority holding was not -varranted and should not encourage any contrary conclusions regarding
large-scale nationalizations. He presumed that the chairman would have
taken the same position even in a case of large-scale nationalization, once
having dictated the award in AIG. As the chairman in both cases, I
would not have been able to give a definite answer to this question at
that time.
The last chapter, "Other Monetary Issues," addresses the issues of
interest, costs and lawyers fees, and currency conversion rates. The author notes that the issue pertaining to interest became one of the most
significant issues in terms of the compensation realized by successful
claimants, especially since the interest awards would double the principal amounts awarded as time passed. On these issues, however, the Tribunal awards demonstrate no common position. Some awards grant a
flat rate of between ten and twelve percent, while others are more flexible and seek guidance in the varying investment rates in the United
States. Following an unsuccessful attempt in the Sylvania Technical Services v. Iran3' award to lay down basic principles that could be followed
by all three chambers, the interest rate issues appeared before the full
Tribunal for an authoritative decision in Case A-19.32 The majority of
the Tribunal held that the power to award interest-which Iran contested by invoking Islamic law-was inherent in the authority to decide
claims on the basis of respect for law. This is because interest customarily has been included in the compensation awarded for damages by
international tribunals. On all other issues raised, which included the
interest rate and interest period, the full Tribunal declined to set any
standard. It reasoned that these were matters for the individual chambers
to decide in their discretion on the basis of the particular circumstances
of each case. Consequently, the divergence continued to exist.
As for the period for which the Tribunal awarded interest, most
awards accept as the starting point the date of the cause of action and
award interest up to the full payment. A special formula is used for

30.
31.

Id. at 187.
Sylvania Technical Services, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 8 Iran-U.S. Cl.

Trib. Rep. 298 (1985).
32. Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States, 16 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 785
(1987).
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payments out of the security account.
The issues pertaining to currency conversion rates are important because of the wide fluctuations of these rates during the past decades. For
example, in a case in which the cause of action occurred in 1977 and the
award occurred in 1990, the relation between the United States dollar
and the rial changed many times. Therefore, the basic issue to be determined is the date as of which the rate is fixed. In contract cases, a substantial majority of Tribunal awards have decided to fix the conversion
rate on the date when the obligation or payment became due. In nationalization and expropriation cases, the Tribunal generally has chosen the
date when the taking took place, rather than the date of the award or
payment, as argued by Iran.
Concluding Comments
The author writes in a clear, unsophisticated style that makes the
book easy to read. Most of the chapters and their sections begin with a
seemingly accurate statement of the pertinent, prevailing, legal principles
of international law. As is apparent from the long list of acknowledgements, the chapters already have been scrutinized by many able jurists. Thus, these introductory notes form a useful background to the
Tribunal decisions, allowing readers to develop opinions on whether the
Tribunal made new law or merely clarified accepted legal principles.
The presentation of the Tribunal awards is brief, but seemingly accurate, and should be sufficient to make the reader understand the conclusions reached, Only on a couple of points have I found the presentation
of majority awards too summary in comparison with lengthy dissenting
or concurring opinions recorded. This fact may lead to a misapprehension regarding the majority reasoning.
The surveys of the awards are generally descriptive. The author usually refrains from expressing his approval or dislike of a decision. This, I
believe, is the best way to present the vast number of complicated issues
that this book contains.
Before concluding this book review, I should like to comment on a
subject that, for obvious reasons, Mr. Westberg has not addressed: the
sometimes difficult working conditions in the Tribunal and their impact
on the decision-making process. 3 Because of their different cultural, religious, and political backgrounds, as well as their differing concepts of
law and approach to legal issues, the national arbitrators have difficulty
relating when deliberating and adjudicating claims. Unanimous decisions
are rare in contested cases; dissenting opinions usually accompany the
33. See generally Mangard, supra note 4.
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awards. It is for the chairman to attempt to negotiate the required majority of two votes, under considerable pressure from the other two arbitrators, and often in an atmosphere of tension and distrust.
The resulting award is not always one that any of the arbitrators
among the majority would have rendered if acting alone. For instance,
concurring United States arbitrators frequently begin written opinions,
which in reality are dissents, with a sentence to the effect that they reluctantly join in the award "only to form the necessary majority," and proceed to severely criticize that same award. The necessity for compromise
and the contentious political climate both contribute to rendering a chairman unwilling, or even unable, to innovate in the field of law. The
chairman prudently stays within the boundaries of what are commonly
accepted rules and principles. In addition, it should be noted that the
mission of the Tribunal is, inter alia, to "decide all cases on the basis of
respect for law, applying such ... principles of international law as the
Tribunal determines to be applicable ... ,,a This provision, with its

reference to "respect for law," arguably can be construed as limiting the
Tribunal's freedom, in its choice of applicable principles, to deviate from
current international law. The working conditions mentioned above also
may explain, at least in part, why the conclusions reached in certain
awards may seem surprising, if not questionable, to legal writers.
Judge Lagergren has pointed out that the many forceful dissenting
and concurring opinions tend to limit the authority of the Tribunal
awards. Accordingly, he urges that care must be exercised in concluding
from the awards that an opinio juris communis is emerging. Nevertheless, the possible legal flaws in some of the Tribunal awards do not detract from the merits of the systematic presentation of the awards in this
interesting book. Mr. Westberg has undertaken an impressive task and
accomplished it in an excellent fashion, benefitting both the international
legal community and the international business lawyer.

34.

CSD, supra note 2, at art. V, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. C1. Trib. Rep. at 11.

INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS AND CLAIMS INVOLVING GOVERNMENT PARTIES: CASE LAW OF THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS

TRIBUNAL. By John Westberg, International Law Institute, Washing-

ton, D.C.: 1991. Pp. 412. $125.

Reviewed by Koorosh H. Ameli*
Because I generally adopt the views expressed in Mr. Mangard's review,' I choose only to add a few words to the points he has covered and
a few to those that he has not.
Expropriation Cases
In the opening chapter of his book, Mr. Westberg promises "to examine the awards of the Tribunal and not the Tribunal itself." 2 Despite
that promise, the book completely ignores the separate opinions of the
Iranian judges, and yet, as has been noted by Mr. Mangard, it records
and often elevates the opinion of the United States judges to the status of
the Tribunal's actual opinion.
For example, in INA Corp. v. Iran,3 I wrote a declaration, as well as
a sixty-eight page dissenting opinion, dealing with the issue of compensation. There, I analyzed the law and practice concerning the issues
raised in both the award and in the separate opinions of my two colleagues, President Lagergren and Judge Holtzmann. I also indicated my
agreement with President Lagergren's separate opinion and demonstrated why Judge Holtzmann's separate opinion was erroneous in several respects. Mr. Westberg's book fails to analyze my opinion, instead
equating Judge Holtzmann's separate opinion with that of President
Lagergren and presenting them as "a remarkable example of how two
*

LL.B. 1973, LL.M. 1975, National University of Iran; LL.M. 1977, Harvard

Law School; Ad Hoc Member of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 1985-1987;

Member of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal 1990-present.
1. Nils Mang~rd, International Transactions and Claims Involving Government
Parties: Case Law of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, 24 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 597
(1991).

2. J.

WESTBERG, INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS AND CLAIMS INVOLVING Gov-

ERNMENT PARTIES: CASE LAW OF THE IRAN-UNITED

STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 3

(1991).

3.

INA Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 373 (1985).
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learned and experienced international arbitrators with differing perspectives can find different meaning and draw different conclusions from the
same collection of authorities." 4 Thus, I should note that the book's
equation of these two judges is inappropriate. In fact, Judge
Holtzmann's own opinion demonstrates that he, himself, would not
equate his opinion with that of Judge Lagergren.
The substantive law of the INA decision and its treatment in the book
also merit discussion. In INA, I joined President Lagergren in holding
that current international law requires appropriate compensation, as opposed to the prompt, adequate, and effective formula of the 1938 Hull
Doctrine that has been interpreted as requiring full compensation for
lawful nationalizations. "What is required is to start with the compensation methods put forward in the nationalizing state's legislation and subject these to the current requirements of international law that can be
proven to be generally accepted." 6 These minimum international law requirements would subject the discretion of the nationalizing state only to
some "ideals of fundamental fairness."'7 In determining the appropriate
compensation, courts should look at, inter alia, whether investors unduly
enriched themselves, whether the investments contributed to the economic and social development of the host state, and whether the investors
respected the laws of the host state, including its labor law and reinvestment 'policies. While some have argued that the Treaty of Amity8 would
govern the measure of compensation, its provisions still must be interpreted in light of changes in international law and cannot, by itself, justify an award of compensation greater than that provided under international law.9
The book also inaccurately documents the case law surrounding the
inclusion of lost profits in Tribunal awards and ignores many Tribunal
awards that reject the inclusion of lost profits.1 0 Specifically, the author

4.

WESTBERG,

supra note 2, at 231 n.89.

5. "Judge Lagergren's eminence commands our attention and impels careful analysis
of his views." INA, 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 392.
6. Id. at 416.
7. Id. 447-50 (citations omitted).
8. Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, Aug. 15, 1955,
United States-Iran, 8 U.S.T. 899, 284 U.N.T.S. 93.
9. See generally Derek W. Bowett, State Contracts with Aliens: ContemporaryDevelopments on Compensationfor Termination or Breach, 59 BRITISH Y.B. INT'L LAW
49 (1988).
10. StarrettHousing Corp. v. Islamic Republic ofIran, 16 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep.
112 (1987), nominally supports the inclusion of lost profits. In that case, however, the
award granted was relatively low compared to the relief sought or the figure suggested by
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places undue reliance upon the nullified award in PhillipsPetroleum v.
Iran" in support of including lost profits in Tribunal expropriation
awards. The nullification of the original award in PhillipsPetroleum is
mentioned only in a footnote in Chapter Seven, stating that it merely
raises "some question as to the status of the original award.1 12 Since
both the settlement agreement between the parties and the Award on
Agreed Terms specifically indicated that the original award "shall be
deemed by the parties as null and void and of no effect,' 3 it hardly can
be held out as the valid jurisprudence of the Tribunal. Moreover, before
the Tribunal issued the Award on Agreed Terms, the Agent of Iran
indicated that if the Tribunal sought to make even the slightest change
in the terms of the agreement, Iran would reject the agreement. Indeed,
if the original award had resolved the dispute and terminated the proceedings or had any final and binding effect, the Tribunal could not
render the Award on Agreed Terms in the same case, pursuant to the
Tribunal Rules. 4
Likewise, Chapter Seven does not indicate that the original award in
PhillipsPetroleum resulted in the challenge of Judge Briner, the presiding chairman, for certain irregularities in the making of the award and
also resulted in the subsequent revocation proceeding before the full Tribunal in Case A25. 5 The book further ignores that the original award
was not signed by the Iranian judge, who filed separate opinions concerning problems with the original award."
the Tribunal expert in the sense of full compensation. In making adjustments to the
figure suggested by the Tribunal expert, the Tribunal reduced the expert's estimate of
the project's future income by 92%, leaving only 27 million rials, about $382,000. As
suggested in my statement, the Tribunal's acceptance of an additional adjustment for
utility charges a day before the filing of the award would easily wipe out the abovereferenced positive value that the Tribunal had reached much earlier. Id. at 256.
11. Phillips Petroleum Co. Iran v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 21 Iran-U.S. C1. Trib.
Rep. 79 (1989) (Original Award).

12.

WESTBERG,

supra note 2, at 233 n.97.

13. Phillips Petroleum Co. Iran v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 21 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.
Rep. 285, 286 (1989) (Award on Agreed Terms).
14. "If, before the award is made, the parties agree on a settlement of the dispute,
the arbitral tribunal shall either issue an order for the termination of the arbitral proceedings or, if requested by both parties and accepted by the tribunal, record the settlement in the form of an arbitral award on agreed terms." Final Tribunal Rules of Procedure, art. 34, para. 1, reprinted in 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 435 (1983).
15. Memorial of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the National Iranian Oil Co.,
reprinted in 1989 IRANIAN AssETs LITIG. REP. 18232-78; see also Islamic Republic of
Iran v. United States, 21 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 302 (1990) (Full Tribunal Termination Order).
16. An arbitrator's refusal to sign an award may have profound consequences on its
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Although an award may be nullified in part, the nullification of the
original award in Phillips Petroleum was total. Moreover, because the
nullification decreased the so-called full compensation by as large a figure as nine million dollars, excluding interest, the whole compensation
formula and the resulting sum were so altered that neither the award's
validity, nor the compensation formula, could be maintained. The Award
on Agreed Terms provides a lucid example of how the mechanical calculations of a tribunal can result in such an unreasonable outcome that
both parties reject the award in favor of a much lower and more realistic
figure.
7 is similarly
The book's discussion of Starrett Housing Corp. v. Iran"
superficial. Chapter Seven makes no mention of my statement or refusal
to sign the award. Nor does it provide any critique of the use of discounted cash flow with a twenty-eight percent discount rate, applied on
a monthly basis, for a relatively short two-year construction project. The
Starrett panel's method of valuation has been the subject of criticism
since the discounted cash flow method is used typically for the valuation
of going concerns with a large future expectancy of continuing business.
The Tribunal issued few awards under conditions that should not be
criticized. In many instances, the presiding judge was challenged, but
nevertheless persisted in maintaining his position against Iranian protests. Other judges were imposed upon the Tribunal despite vigorous opposition from Iran. Moreover, the high stakes of the Tribunal's decisions
have encouraged the United States to adopt an ultra-conservative position on many issues, despite the conflict of these positions with those of
several United States scholars. For example, the United States has attempted, with some success, to prevent the codification of the current
international law in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES. Professor Oscar Schachter of
Columbia University notes that these hostile groups of influential United
States lawyers have created obstacles to avoid any risk that a flexible
formula would allow the Tribunal to reduce awards of full
compensation.'

validity because this award has not been "decided by a panel [that shall consist] of three
members." Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of
Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States
and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, art. III, para. 1, reprinted in I
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 9, 10 (1981-82) [hereinafter CSD].
17, Starrett Housing Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 16 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep.
112 (1987).
18. Oscar Schachter, The Question of ExpropriationCompensationin the United
Nations Code in the Light of Recent State Policy and Practice(forthcoming from United
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Exemplifying the extreme position taken by these groups of United
States attorneys, their British forerunner, Elihu Lauterpacht, does not
agree even with the nullified Phillips Petroleum award's inclusion of
"equitable considerations"" in determining compensation for the value
of the expropriated property. His view is that any reduction runs contrary to the "full equivalent of the property" standard of the Treaty of
Amity.20 Unfortunately, Mr. Lauterpacht ignores the fact that equitable
considerations are the prime justification for excluding post-expropriation events in valuing expropriated property. The Treaty of Amity has
no reference to exclusion of post-expropriation events that would reduce
considerably the value of the property. Also, the Treaty does not support
the claim that compensation payments be made immediately and in cash
dollars, nor does it support the claim that such payments include interest
from the date of taking. Indeed, as Judge Lagergren stated in Starrett,
there does not exist "any general obligation in current international law
to make payment of compensation immediately on the date of taking."2
At most "it might be reasonable to allow interest to run only from the
date or dates (in case of payments in installments) on which the compensation was to be paid."'22 Consequently, an arbitral tribunal may award
the compensation in installment payments with different running methods for any interest that accrues.
Moreover, there are no Tribunal awards actually granting lost profits,
a major component of the full compensation formula. Awards that indicate otherwise actually have reduced the full compensation sought by
seventy-five to eighty percent. Although book value has not been recognized as the compensation formula in those awards, the United States,
based on identical provisions of a similar Treaty of Amity, has sought
23
the book value of the alleged expropriated property in other cases.
Like the present day advocates of the Hull Doctrine, I do not wish to

Nations Center on Transnational Corporations, Symposium on the Outstanding Issues in
the United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations held in The Hague,
Sept. 1989).
19. Phillips Petroleum Co., 21 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 123.
20. Elihu Lauterpacht, Issues of Compensation and Nationality in the Taking of
Energy Investments, 8 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURcEs L. 241, 243 (1990).
21. Starrett Housing Corp., 16 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 112 n.63.
22. Id.; see also, Gunner Lagergren, Five Important Cases on Nationalization of
Foreign Property, Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian
Law, Report No. 5, at 26 (1988).
23. Case Concerning Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (U.S. v. Italy) 1989 I.C.J. 15 (1989)
[hereinafter ELSI]. The court's judgment did not reach the compensation issue.
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advocate the Calvo Doctrine.24 One should, however, take into account
whether the status of the alien property or investment has been transformed into a domestic investment, either by incorporation or by long
term operation in the host state. Indeed, if a state such as the United
States considers an alien, permanent resident bound to join its armed
forces and to defend its interests in distant places like Vietnam or the
Persian Gulf, it may be appropriate to reconsider the alien status of the
investment when the host state faces fundamental social and economic
changes pursuant to revolution, war, or otherwise. Certainly property
should not be put above life, even by capitalists. Judge Oda, in his individual concurring opinion in ELSI, indicated that it was possible that the
Italian subsidiary could have suffered wrongs that did not necessarily
affect the United States parent company. In such a case, an international
claim could not have been lodged.2 5
Forum-Selection Clause Cases
Chapters Three and Five deal with nine decisions of the Full Tribunal on the topic of forum-selection clauses. Of the nineteen different contractual forum clauses involved in these cases, the Tribunal only permitted the exclusion of claims based on six such clauses. This represented a
very small number and an insignificant amount of claims in those and
other cases before the Tribunal. From the outset, it was also clear to the
majority of the Tribunal that expropriation claims involving, or even
based on, contracts containing unambiguous Iranian-forum clauses still
would not be excluded from the Tribunal's jurisdiction.2"
The Ford Aerospace v. Iran2 7 test case involved a large number of
other major cases before the Tribunal, and thus deserves special attention. This case represented about 300 million dollars in military contract
claims, including the IBEX cases. The contract provided, in relevant
part:
All disputes and differences between the two parties arising out of interpretation of the Contract or execution of the Works which can not be
settled in friendly way, shall be settled in accordance with the rules provided by the Iranian laws, via referring to the competent Iranian courts.28
24. WESTBERG, supra note 2, at 212 n.7.
25. ELSI, 1989 I.C.J. at 86.
26.

Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v. TAMS-AFFA Consulting Engineers of

Iran, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 219 (1984).
27.

Ford Aerospace & Comm. Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl.

Trib. Rep. 268 (1982).
28. Id. at 69.
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The Tribunal unjustifiably held that for this clause to deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction, it must be worded broadly enough to encompass
"any" claim arising under the contract. Arguing that it was limited to
the interpretation of the contract and the execution of works, the Tribunal asserted jurisdiction over all claims, including those claims that
should have been referred to Iranian courts. The Tribunal erroneously
held the disputes as to the claimant's certain performance outside of Iran
and the respondent's certain performance, such as payment of the invoices, to be outside the scope of the clause. As such, the disputes were
found not to prevent the Tribunal from asserting jurisdiction over "all"
claims arising under the contract. 29 This is because the CSD excludes
"claims arising under a binding contract between the parties specifically
providing that any disputes thereunder shall be within the sole jurisdiction of the competent Iranian courts in response to the Majlis
position." 30
The Tribunal did not distinguish between "any" and "all," even
though "any" clearly refers to each unit of the subject, whereas "all"
refers to every unit of the subject. Thus, if the clause covered a certain
contractual dispute, it should have been excluded from the Tribunal's
jurisdiction. Even assuming that "any" and "all" are synonymous, "execution of the works," was clearly broad enough to encompass performance of "actions," "obligations," "duties," and "tasks." The governing
Persian version of the contract employed the Persian word "karha,"
which is synonymous with "actions" and "affairs," for "execution of the
works." 1 "Karha" encompasses all the above-stated variations of the
word "works."' 2
Disputes as to "execution of works" include nonpayment of invoices
for works, regardless of whether certain works are carried out abroad.
Moreover, in principle, all municipal courts, including those of Iran, are
competent to deal with such ancillary issues if they are competent to deal
with the principal matter. Their jurisdiction and competence have even
more force when the parties, one of whom is a government, agree by
contract to confer jurisdiction upon them.

29. Id. at 270.

para. 1, reprinted in 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep.
30. CSD, supra note 16, at art. II,
at 9.
31. The Tribunal's consideration of the use of the word "karha" elsewhere in these
contracts in Sylvania Technical Systems, Inc. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, 8 IranU.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 298, 306-307 (1985), is also not quite on point.
32. The use of the word "karha," as well as the original Arabic word "omour," in
the governing Persian version of the contract reflects the Imperial Army insistence on the
use of Persian words when they were available.
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Despite the obvious influence of power politics on the Ford Aerospace
decision, the book fails to criticize that holding. The book's treatment of
the Iranian-forum clause cases is similar to the writings of other United
States lawyers on this topic.
The book under review, like the two dissenting United States arbitrators in Ford Aerospace, has limited its criticism only to the few insignifi3 The Tribunal
cant cases, such as Drucker Rice and Cement Contracts."
excluded these cases from its jurisdiction, dismissing the arguments
raised by the United States of binding contract and changed circumstances that fundamentally altered the Iranian court system. Without
much evaluation of the actual decision, Mr. Westberg argues that the
Tribunal should have adhered to the United States position in those
cases. Here, as in other sections, the book minimizes the view of the
Tribunal majority, instead providing detailed recitations of the dissenting
opinions of the two United States arbitrators, as pointing to "persuasive
authority to support a contrary conclusion." s4 Furthermore, the book ignores the fact that any fundamental changes in the Iranian court system
occurred before the conclusion of the Algiers Declarations by the two
governments and were well-known to the United States and its drafters
at the declarations. Nevertheless, those same drafters did not provide for
a clear term in the CSD or seek the specific agreement of the Iranian
side on such an ambiguous understanding of "binding contract" for the
intended purpose.
In Drucker, the Tribunal allotted four pages to the argument and affidavit of Warren Christopher, the former Deputy Secretary of State who
led the United States negotiating team. The Tribunal decided that, unless otherwise specifically provided, "[i]t is not generally the task of this
Tribunal . . . to determine the enforceability of choice of forum clauses
in contracts." 35 The Tribunal also held that "binding contract" normally
refers to the entire contract, rather than only to its forum clause, and
noted that a contrary holding would result in a vicious circle. 6 An example of this would be a situation in which the validity of the contract

33. Drucker v. Foreign Transaction Co., 1 Iran-U.S. C. Trib. Rep. 252 (1982).
34. WESTBERG, supra note 2, at 176. The book also extensively quotes the views of
the late Ted Stein in support of the views of the two United States arbitrators, but fails
to mention that Mr. Stein worked on these cases as a State Department consultant until
the date of the hearing.
35. Drucker, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 255.
36. Id. at 256; Halliburton Co. v. Doreen/IMCO, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 242,
246 (1982); T.C.S.B. v. Iran, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 261, 266 (1982); Stone &
Webster Overseas Group v. Nat'l Petrochemical Co., 1 Iran-U.S.. Cl. Trib. Rep. 274,
277 (1982).
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and the Tribunal's jurisdiction have been questioned. In such a case, the
word "binding" would be redundant. The redundancy argument here is
not against the rule of effective interpretation since one of the claimants
in these cases argued that, under Iranian law, the entire contract was
37
permissive rather than binding.
Because the Iranian party insisted upon obtaining a statement from
the Tribunal that such claims must be shifted to Iranian courts, and the
United States party insisted upon pressing its changed circumstances
claim, the Tribunal did not find it necessary to address whether changes
in Iran may have an impact on the enforceability of these forum selection
clauses. Contrary to Mr. Mangard's suggestion,38 the United States filed
every possible piece of evidence, from translation of the unrelated Islamic
Penal Retribution Bill to affidavits of persons such as Professor Coulson,
its expert on Iranian law. Iran objected that these were irrelevant to civil
cases, as well as to the arbitration cases, under supervision of Iranian
courts.
Moreover, neither the book under review, the dissenting opinions of
the two United States arbitrators, nor any commentary on the matter,
has cited one decision of an arbitral tribunal determining the enforceability of choice of other forum clauses in contracts. Municipal courts do not
derive their jurisdiction from a compromis such as the Algiers Declarations. A conjectural sentence in the individual opinion of British Judge
Fitzmaurice in the FisheriesJurisdictionCases39 is certainly not even an
obiter dictum of the International Court of Justice (the Court), despite
the fact that Judge Holtzmann's dissent attempts to elevate it to the status of a Court principle.4 In the meantime, these critics knew that
United States courts had shown enthusiasm to assert jurisdiction in simi-

37. Under Iranian law, some contracts are permissive by nature. Thus, they can be
revoked at will by either party despite the fact that there is no such provision in the
contract. These contracts are revoked involuntarily as well, in cases such as death or
insanity. See IRANIAN CIVIL CODE arts. 181, 186, 611, 638, 678-83, reprinted in THE
CIVIL CODE OF IRAN 41, 42, 99, 103, 107-08 (M. Sabi trans. 1973).
38. Mangard, supra note 1, at 603.
39. 1973 I.C.J. 33. After stating that he had nothing to add to what is stated in the
judgment, Judge Fitzmaurice noted that in his "opinion the only change that could possibly be relevant (if at all) would be some change relating directly to the, so to speak,
operability of the jurisdictional clause itself." As a footnote, he added, "[for instance if
the character of the International Court itself had changed in the meantime so that it was
no longer the entity the Parties had had in mind." Id. at 33 n.16.
40. Concurring and Dissenting Opinions of Howard M. Holtzmann with respect to
Interlocutory Awards on Jurisdiction in Nine Cases Containing Various Forum Selection Clauses, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 284, 290.
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lar cases on the basis of these arguments.4"
Another deficiency in Mr. Westberg's discussion of forum-selection
clauses is that it fails to deal with the impact of third country arbitration
clauses that the Tribunal unanimously held to be within its jurisdiction.
In Reading & Bates, 42 the United States claimant had filed its claim
before both the Tribunal and the International Chambers of Commerce
Court of Arbitration in Paris (ICC). The Tribunal ordered the claimant
to move for a stay of the ICC proceeding.43 In another case, however,
two United States partner claimants had filed no claim with the Hague
Tribunal. Therefore, the ICC tribunal unanimously asserted jurisdiction, but only because the other two partner claimants were not United
States citizens and the partnership had not been formed under United
States law. 44 As such, the CSD did not cover that claim.

Other Changed Circumstances Cases
At the outset of this discussion, I would agree with the book that the
Tribunal has used the changed circumstances much less than expected.
As to the specific changed circumstances cases, however, I would take
issue with the author's suggestion in Chapter Five that Chamber One's
Questech4B holding conflicts with Chamber Three's Mobil Oil46 decision,
41. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, No. CV-4918
LEWS [PX] (C.D.Cal. 1981), reprinted in 1981 Iranian Assets Litig. Rep., 2391, 2438
(granting the claim although it was based on a contract containing an Iranian forum
selection clause). The judgment in the district court was suspended, and the claim was
brought to the Tribunal pursuant to the Algiers Declaration. The Tribunal dismissed
the claim because of the Iranian forum selection clause. Dames & Moore v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 212, 219-20. Moreover, in Continental
Grain Export Corp. v. Ministry of War-ETKA, 603 F. Supp. 724 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), a
United States court asserted jurisdiction over a company's claim against Iran, despite the
fact that it was based on a contract containing an Iranian forum selection clause. The
United States Court ignored both the clause and that the Tribunal already had given
effect to the clause by dismissing the claimant's case at the Hague. Continental Grain
Export Corp. v. Government Trading Corp., 3 Iran-U.S. CTR 319 (1983). The United
States court based its finding on the fact that the Iranian defendant had not rebutted the
claim that trial in Iran would be "unreasonable and unjust." Continental Grain, 603 F.
Supp. at 729.
42. Reading and Bates Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.
Rep. 401 (1983).
43. This motion subsequently resulted in the termination of the ICC proceeding:
44. GTE Int'l Inc., NEC Corp., Page Comm. Engineers, Inc., Siemens Aktiengesellschaft v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 4209 (ICC, Paris, 1985), reprinted in 1984 Iranian Assets Litig. Rep., 7912, 8065.
45. Questech, Inc. v. Ministry of Defence of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 9 IranU.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 107 (1985).
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4 decision, and the nulliChamber Two's Amoco InternationalFinance
4
fied Phillips Petroleum" cases. A careful look at these awards indicates
no conflict. In Rockwell,49 Chamber One affirmed Questech by holding
that contracts may, by themselves, come to an end as a result of changed
circumstances, or alternatively, that such changes may justify termination
by the parties. In Rockwell, Chamber One did "not find, however, that

the victory of the Islamic Revolution ... automatically ... resulted in a

cancellation of all contractual obligations,"5' 0 and used Chamber Three's
Mobil Oil decision as support.
Chamber Three's statement in Mobil Oil on changed circumstances
also should be considered in light of the fact that it did not reach the
grant of compensation because the parties later settled the case. Furthermore, the same chamber, when granting compensation in McCollough,51
stated that it found "that general principles of law require the Tribunal
to give certain consideration to the effect which the relative value of the
Iranian rials to the US dollars may have on the satisfaction awarded the
Claimant. This is all the more imperative as the Tribunal is required by
Article V of the Claims Settlement Declaration to take into consideration
'changed circumstances.' ",52
A better reason for recognition of the right of the Defense Ministry to
terminate the contract after the Islamic Revolution, however, could be
found in the state's inherent power to terminate public contracts in the
public interest with no duty to compensate the contractor for lost profits
or any consequential damages. This is a general principle of law, as well
as of Iranian law. 3 "The most radical of special prerogatives enjoyed by
the administration is the right to terminate the contract unilaterally,
when the public interest so requires. This drastic power is a widespread
feature of national systems of procurement, and is evidently considered
46. Mobil Oil Iran Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 16 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3
(1987).

47. Amoco Int'l Fin. Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 15 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep.
189 (1987).

48. Phillips Petroleum Co. Iran v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 21 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.
Rep. 79 (1989); Phillips Petroleum Company Iran v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 21 Iran-

U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 285 (1989).
49.

Rockwell Int'l Systems v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 23 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep.

150 (1989).
50.

Id. at 171. Judge Holtzmann, meanwhile, maintained his Questech dissenting

opinion. Id. at 218 n.3.
51.

McCollough & Co., Inc. v. Ministry of Post, Telegraph & Telephone, 11 Iran-

U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3 (1986).
52. Id. at 32-33.
53. Bowett, supra note 9, at 53-59.
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necessary in order to maintain the freedom of action of public
authorities.""'
Every public contract implicitly recognizes the right of the state to
pass subsequent statutes empowering it to exercise its power of eminent
domain or terminate contracts in the public interest. A lawful requisition
or termination, rather than breach, of a contract may require only just
compensation and not damages for anticipatory profits. 55 As the United
States Supreme Court has stated, "[t]he taking of private property for
public use upon just compensation is so often necessary for the proper
performance of governmental functions that the power is deemed to be
essential to the life of the State. It cannot be surrendered, and, if attempted to be contracted away, it may be resumed at will. ' 56 Also, an
English Court of Appeal has stated that "a government cannot fetter its
duty to act for the public good. It cannot bind itself-by an implication
in the contract-not to perform its public duties."'57 In other words, as a
matter of constitutional or fundamental law, parliamentary supremacy
bars contract stabilization against future legislation, even if a public contract has also been ratified by Parliament.
Mitigation of Damages in Breach of Contract Cases
My remarks on Chapter Six concern the claimant's obligation of damage mitigation, as discussed in Endo LaboratoriesInc. v. Iran.58 1 principally share Judge Mang~rd's view that a claimant's obligation to mitigate damages may be discharged by the impossibility or impracticability.
For example, in the state in which production occurs, it may not be
feasible to repackage and sell products such as pharmaceuticals that have
been made for use in another state. Claimants may discharge this obligation by giving the original purchaser proper notice of the impossibility
and of any intention to dispose of the products by donation to local charitable organizations. Otherwise, any donation should be made to charitable organizations of the state of the purchaser, rather than of the state of
the producer. Any charitable organization in the purchaser's state would

54. VII Int'l Encyclopedia of Comp. L. 40 (1982) (reviewing the legal systems of
France, West Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States).
55. See, e.g., J. MCBRIDE & I. WACHTEL, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS, § 30.40
(1976).
56. Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472, 480 (1924) (citations omitted).
57. Czarnikow Ltd. v. Centrala Handlu Zagranicznego Rolimpex, [1977] 3 WLR
677, 686 (per Lord Denning), affd House of Lords [1978] 3 WLR 274 (H.L.).
58. Endo Laboratories v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 17 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.,Rep. 114

(1987).
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be ready to undertake transportation charges, considering the high demand for the pharmaceuticals at the time because of the revolution and
war. In any event, at least tax and similar benefits obtained from the
donation could reduce the claimant's damages. None of these points have
been dealt with in the majority or dissenting opinions of the Tribunal in
Endo Laboratoriesor in Mr. Mangard's book review.
Conclusion
In my view, priority should be given to the unanimous awards of the
Tribunal when trying to discern the authoritative statements of the law.
This priority should also extend to the full Tribunal majority awards,
for which there is at least one vote from each block of the arbitrators.
Other majority awards should be considered in light of all circumstances
of the case, as well as the Tribunal, rather than only in view of the
separate, opinion of the United States arbitrator.
Despite the foregoing criticisms, the book's lessons for the international business lawyer are valuable to both corporate and government
lawyers, although the book's focus is generally on the corporate lawyer.
John Westberg has done a valuable work for which I congratulate him
and those who assisted him.

